The Encyclopedia of public choice [electronic resource] / editors, Charles K. Rowley and Friedrich Schneider.

Offers a detailed and comprehensive account of the subject that deals with the intersection of economics and political science. Its fruitful exchange among ethics, moral and political philosophy, and law, as well as economics and political science, examines the image of man as a purposive and ration...

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Bibliographic Details
Online Access: Full Text (via Springer)
Other Authors: Rowley, Charles K., 1939-2013, Schneider, Friedrich
Format: Electronic eBook
Language:English
Published: Dordrecht ; Boston : Kluwer Academic Publishers, ©2004.
Subjects:
Table of Contents:
  • Volume I: Part I: Essays: Public choice and constitutional political economy / Charles K. Rowley
  • Public choice: an introduction / Dennis C. Mueller
  • Are vote and popularity functions economically correct? / Martin Paldam
  • Constitutional political economy / James M. Buchanan
  • Corruption / Susan Rose-Ackerman
  • Dictatorship / Ronald Wintrobe
  • Environmental politics / Hannelore Weck-Hannemann
  • Experimental public choice / Arthur J.H.C. Schram
  • Gordon Tullock at four score years: an evaluation / Charles K. Rowley
  • Interest group behavior and influence / Frans van Winden
  • International trade policy: departure from free trade / Arye L. Hillman
  • James M. Buchanan / Robert D. Tollison
  • Milton Friedman, 1912: harbinger of the public choice revolution / Charles K. Rowley & Anne Rathbone
  • Monetary policy and central bank behavior / Manfred Gärtner
  • The political economy of taxation: positive and normative analysis when collective choice matters / Stanley L. Winer & Walter Hettich
  • Public choice from the perspective of economics / Robert D. Tollison
  • Public choice from the perspective of the history of thought / Charles K. Rowley
  • Public choice theory from the perspective of law / Francesco Parisi
  • Public choice from the perspective of philosophy / Hartmut Kliemt
  • Public choice from the perspective of sociology / Viktor J. Vanberg
  • Public finance / Harvey S. Rosen
  • Regulation and antitrust / William F. Shughart II
  • Scholarly legacy of Mancur Olson / Melvin J. Hinich & Michael C. Munger
  • Shadow economy / Friedrich Schneider
  • Social choice, contracts and logrolling / Peter Bernholz
  • Spatial theory / Melvin J. Hinich & Michael C. Munger
  • Trade liberalization and globalization / Arye L. Hillman
  • William H. Riker / John Aldrich.
  • Part II: Biographies: John Herbert Aldrich
  • Lisa Renée Anderson
  • William J. Baumol
  • Sebastiano Bavetta
  • James Thomas Bennett
  • Bruce Lowell Benson
  • Peter Bernholz
  • Timothy John Besley
  • Portia DiGiovanni Besocke
  • Peter J. Boettke
  • Thomas Earl Borcherding
  • John Charles Bradbury
  • Steven J. Brams
  • James McGill Buchanan
  • Michael J.G. Cain
  • Bryan Douglas Caplan
  • Roger Douglas Congleton
  • Peter Joseph Coughlin
  • Tyler Cowen
  • William mark Crain
  • Michael Anthony Crew
  • Domenico Da Empoli
  • Otto Anderson Davis
  • Robert Burton Ekelund Jr.
  • William A. Fischel
  • Norman Frohlich
  • Thomas A. Garrett
  • Brian L. Goff
  • Bernard N. Grofman
  • Robin Dale Hanson
  • Walter Hettich
  • Melvin J. Hinich
  • Randall Gregory Holcombe
  • Manfred Joseph Holler
  • Charles A. Holt
  • William Hutchison Kaempfer
  • Manfred Werner Keil
  • Lawrence Wagner Kenny
  • Paul Robert Kleindorfer
  • Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard
  • David Neil Laband
  • Laura Langbein
  • Dong Won Lee
  • Dwight R. Lee
  • Susanne Lohmann
  • Edward John López.
  • John G. Matsusaka
  • Fred Sanderson McChesney
  • Ram Mudambi
  • Michael Curtis Munger
  • Pietro Navarra
  • Joe Oppenheimer
  • Fabio Padovano
  • Filip Palda
  • Francesco Parisi
  • Alan Turner Peacock
  • Paul Pecorino
  • Anne Elissa Rathbone
  • Michael Reksulak
  • Thomas Romer
  • Charles Kershaw Rowley
  • Paul Harold Rubin
  • Tim Roger Sadd
  • Stefanie Schmid Luebbert
  • Friedrich Georg Schneider
  • Norman James Schofield
  • Gerald William Scully
  • Itai Sened
  • William Franklin Shugart II
  • Vernon L. Smith
  • Giuseppe Sobbrio
  • Russell Steven Sobel
  • Ekaterina Stepykina
  • Thomas Stratmann
  • Earl Thompson
  • Mark Thornton
  • Thorwald Nicolaus Tideman
  • Robert Dewitt Tollison
  • Edward Tower
  • Gordon Tullock
  • Charlotte Augusta Lewis Twight
  • Arnold Bernard Urken
  • Michelle Albert Vachris
  • Viktor J. Vanberg
  • Roland Vaubel
  • Richard E. Wagner
  • Hannelore Weck-Hannemann
  • Thomas Dunaway Willett
  • Walter E. Williams
  • Stanley Lewis Winer
  • Donald Alan Wittman
  • Wenbo Wu.
  • Volume II: Part I: Concepts: Academia / Susanne Lohmann
  • Al-Qaeda / Anne Rathbone & Charles K. Rowley
  • Alternative voting methods / Bernard Grofman
  • Altruism / Paul H. Rubin
  • The anatomy of political representation / Tim R. Sass
  • Approval voting / Steven J. Brams
  • Arbitration and barganing / Paul Pecorino
  • Arrow's impossibility theorem / Bernard Grofman
  • An 'Austrian' perspective on public choice / Peter Boettke & Peter Leeson
  • Autocracy / Gordon Tullock
  • Autocratic succession / Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard
  • Bicameralism / John Charles Bradbury & W. Mark Crain
  • Blackmail / Walter E. Williams
  • Black's single-peakedness condition / Bernard Grofman
  • Budgetary processes / W. Mark Crain
  • Budget deficits / William F. Shughart II
  • Bureaucratic discretion / Laura Langbein
  • Campaign contributions and campaign finance / Thomas Stratmann
  • Campaign finance 1 / Edward J. López
  • Campaign finance 2 / Filip Palda
  • Central banks / Susanne Lohmann
  • Chicago political authority / Robert D. Tollison
  • The Clayton act / Carlos D. Ramírez
  • Coalitions and power indices / Itai Sened
  • Coase theorem and political markets / Francesco Parisi
  • Coercion / Sebastiano Bavetta & Antonio Cognata
  • Collective action under the articles of confederation / Keith Dougherty
  • Committee assignments / Michael Munger
  • Committee jurisdictions and PAC contributions / Michael C. Munger
  • Committees in legislatures / Randall G. Holcombe
  • Commons and anticommons / Francesco Parisi & Ben Depoorter
  • Constitution / Gordon Tullock
  • Constitutional frameworks and economic progress / Gerald W. Scully
  • The Constitution of the European Union / Stephanie Schmid-Lubbert & Hans-Bernd Schafer
  • Constitutional political economy / Stefan Voigt.
  • The contemporary political economy approach to bureaucracy / Thomas E. Borcherding & Portia D. Besocke
  • Contractarianism / James M. Buchanan
  • Corruption 1 / Francesco Forte
  • Corruption 2 / Omar Azfar
  • Cost and choice / James M. Buchanan
  • The cost disease of the personal services / William J. Baumol
  • Customary law / Francesco Parisi
  • The demand-revealing process / T. Nicolaus Tideman
  • Deregulation of postal service / Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer
  • Dictators and social contracts / Stefan Voigt
  • Direct democracy / John G. Matsusaka
  • Discrimination / Walter E. Williams
  • Dynamic inconsistency / W. Mark Crain
  • Economic freedom and its measurement / Sebastiano Bavetta
  • Economic freedom and political freedom / Wenbo-Wu & Otto A. Davis
  • Economic regulation / Robert D. Tollison
  • The economic theory of clubs / Gary M. Anderson, William E. Shughart II & Robet D. Tollison
  • Economists versus the public on economic policy / Bryan Caplan
  • Education and the state / Eugenia F. Toma
  • Efficiency of democracy / Donald Wittman
  • Efficiency of democracy? / Charles K. Rowley & Michelle A. Vachris
  • The efficiency of the common law hypothesis / Francesco Parisi
  • Elected versus appointed regulators / Timothy Besley
  • Election models / Peter J. Coughlin
  • Electoral college / Randall G. Holcombe
  • Electoral competition in mixed systems of representation / Ram Mudambi & Pietro Navarra
  • The elusive median voter / Thomas Romer
  • Emerging from the Hobbesian jungle / Bruce L. Benson
  • Endogenous morality / Bruce L. Benson
  • Enron / Michael Reksulak & William F. Shughart II.
  • Environmental politics and economic development / Roger D. Congleton
  • The Euro / Roland Vaubel
  • European political integration / Roland Vaubel
  • Evolution of institutions / Earl Thompson
  • The evolution of law / Bruce L. Benson
  • Experimental economics and public choice / Lisa R. Anderson & Charles A. Holt
  • Experimental public choice / Vernon L. Smith
  • Expressive voting and redistribution / Russell S. Sobel & Gary A. Wagner
  • Fair division / Steven J. Brams
  • Fame and politics / Tyler Cowen
  • Federal reserve system / Mark Toma
  • Forecasting presidential elections in the United States / Henry Chappell
  • Game theory / Steven J. Brams
  • Game theory in public choice / Robin D. Hanson
  • Generality and the efficiency of government / Roger D. Congleton
  • Group roles in evolution and cognition / Adam Gifford Jr.
  • Growth of local government in the United States / Randall G. Holcombe
  • The growth of public expenditure / Sir Alan Turner Peacock
  • The growth of the relative size of government / Thomas E. Borcherding & Dong Lee
  • Heresthetics and the evolution of the US Constitution / Norman Schofield
  • Homo economicus / Robert D. Tollison
  • Human evolution and political behavior / Paul H. Rubin
  • Ideology / Paul H. Rubin
  • The importance of the middle in spatial politics / Otto A. Davis & Melvin J. Hinich
  • Initiative and referendum / John G. Matsusaka
  • Institutions of trade protection / Willem Thorbecke
  • Interest groups 1 / Michael C. Munger
  • Interest groups 2 / Filip Palda.
  • International game of power / Peter Bernholz
  • International organization / Roland Vaubel
  • Internet voting / Arnold B. Urken
  • Is Russia a market economy? / Ekaterina Stepykina
  • Is voting rational? / William F. Shughart II
  • The Italian public finance contribution to public choice / Domenico da Empoli
  • The judiciary / Gary M. Anderson
  • The law and economics movement / Francesco Parisi
  • Legal precedents and judicial discretion / Ben Deoorter
  • Legal rules and standards / Hans-Bernd Schaefer
  • Legislative politics / William F. Shughart II
  • Legislators / Robert D. Tollison
  • Leviathan models of government / Fabio Padovano
  • Logic of collective action / William F. Shughart II
  • The logic of liberty / Emory Peters
  • Logrolling 1 / Thomas Stratmann
  • Logrolling 2 / Joe Oppenheimer
  • Meddlesome preferences and rent extraction: the tobacco shakedown / Richard E. Wagner
  • The median in politics / David M. Levy
  • The median voter model / Roger D. Congleton
  • Medieval church / Robert B. Ekelund Jr.
  • Mercantilism / Robert B. Ekelund Jr.
  • Monetary politics / Henry Chappell
  • The New Deal / William F. Shughart II
  • Nonprofit organizations / James T. Bennett & William Snavely
  • The origins of social choice theory / Arnold B. Urken
  • The paradox of rebellion / Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard
  • Parchment versus guns / Richard E. Wagner & Holbert L. Harris
  • Political and cultural nationalism / Frank Buckley & Francesco Parisi
  • Political business cycles / Thomas D. Willett & Manfred W. Keil
  • Political economics and public choice / Fabio Padovano
  • The political economy of FEMA disaster payments / Thomas A. Garrett & Russell S. Sobel
  • The political economy of Italian electoral reform / Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra & Giuseppe Sobbrio.
  • Political transaction-cost manipulation / Charles A.L. Twight
  • Pressure groups and uniformed voters / Donald Wittman
  • Principal-agent relationships in the theory of bureaucracy / Michelle A. Vachris
  • Prohibition / Mark Thornton
  • Public choice and socialism / Peter J. Boettke & Peter T. Leeson
  • Public choice and Chicago school of antitrust / Fred S. McChesney
  • Public choice in Italy / Fabio Padovano
  • Public enterprise / Louis De Alessi
  • Public finance and the median voter model / Randall G. Holcombe
  • Public finance in democratic process / Richard E. Wagner
  • Public goods / Laura Razzolini
  • Public schools / Lawrence W. Kenny
  • Public utility regulation / Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer
  • Rational choice approaches to economic and political history / Norman Schofield
  • Rational ignorance / Bryan Caplan
  • Rational irrationality / Bryan Caplan
  • Reciprocity / Francesco Parisi
  • Redistributive politics 1 / Gordon Tullock
  • Redistributive politics 2 / Thomas Romer
  • Regulating government / J.R. Clark & Dwight R. Lee
  • Regulatory takings / Karol Boudreaux
  • Rent dissipation / Gordon Tullock
  • Rent extraction / Fred S. McChesney
  • Rent seeking / Robert D. Tolleson
  • Rent seeking and political institutions / Roger D. Congleton
  • Rent-seeking games / Amiahi Glazer
  • Rent seeking in development / Paul Pecorino
  • The rule of law / Peter J. Boettke & Ryan Oprea
  • Rules versus standards / Francesco Parisi
  • Self-interest / Norman Frohlich & Joe Oppenheimer
  • Selfish gene / Gordon Tullock
  • September 11, 2001 / William F. Shughart II
  • Single-peaked preferences and median voter theorems / Peter J. Coughlin
  • The social cost of rent seeking / David N. Laband
  • Sortion / Alan A. Lockard.
  • Standard Oil and Microsoft: antitrust lessons / Donald J. Boudreaux
  • State-sponsored murder as a rent-seeking activity / Gerald W. Scully
  • Structure-induced equilibrium / William F. Shughart II
  • Supply of public goods / Francesco Forte
  • The Supreme Court / Brian Goff
  • Takings and public choice: the persuasion of price / William A. Fischel
  • Term limits 1 / Edward J. López
  • term limits 2 / Bruce Bender
  • Terrorism / Anne Rathbone & Charles K. Rowley
  • The theory and measurement of economic freedom / Gerald W. Scully
  • Totalitarianism / Peter Bernholz
  • Trade protectionism / William H. Kaempfer, Edward Tower & Thomas D. Willett
  • Transitional economics / Michael J.G. Cain
  • Transitions from autocracy to democracy / Peter Bernholz
  • Triangulation / William F. Shughart II
  • Underground government: the off-budget public sector / James T. Bennett
  • The value of voting rights / Hannelore Weck-Hannemann
  • Votes for women / Lawrence W. Kenny
  • Voting equipment, minorities and the poor / Stephen Knack
  • Voting in U.S. Presidential elections / Robert D. Tollison
  • Voting paradoxes in list systems of proportional representation / Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard
  • The war on drugs / Donald J. Boudreaux
  • Welfare economics and public choice / Timothy Besley
  • Welfare economics and the theory of the state / William J. Baumol
  • Why government succeeds / Amihai Glazer.