Judging Social Rights.
Jeff King argues in favour of constitutionalising social rights, and presents an incrementalist approach to judicial enforcement.
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Format: | eBook |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2012.
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Series: | Cambridge studies in constitutional law.
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Table of Contents:
- Cover; JUDGING SOCIAL RIGHTS; CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; Title; Copyright; CONTENTS; DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS; ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; TABLE OF CASES; TABLE OF LEGISLATION; 1 Introduction: aims and methods; I Introduction; II Why does it matter?; III Arguments against constitutional social rights; A The bad arguments; B The good arguments; C The best argument
- the risky enterprise; IV The case for incrementalism in a nutshell; V Background political conditions
- when the argument applies; A The background political conditions; B When the conditions do not apply; VI Conclusion.
- PART I The case for constitutional social rights2 The case for social rights; I Introduction; II Different senses of 'social rights'; III Social rights, human rights, and the welfare state; A Social rights as human rights: form and justification; B The basic content of social human rights; 1 The social minimum; 2 The basic duties in respect of the social minimum; C State responsibility and the welfare state; IV Multi-institutional protection of social rights; A Legislative; B Executive/administrative; C Adjudicative; D Constitutional; V Conclusion.
- 3 The value of courts in light of the alternativesI Introduction; II The prima facie benefits of legal accountability; III The courts and social change; A Significant social change; B Impact and administrative justice; C A pathology of legalism?; D A hollow hope for the poor?; IV Alternatives to courts: partner or substitute?; A Specialised adjudication
- tribunals; B Ombudsmen; C Alternative dispute resolution (ADR); V Conclusion: the role of law in an incrementalist approach; 4 A basic interpretive approach; I Introduction; II Constitutional social rights: a basic interpretive approach.
- A The structure of rights: scope of interest and nature of obligationB Constitutional text: absolute and qualified obligations; C Judicial interpretation: the inescapability of vagueness; III The need for an approach to judicial restraint; A Social rights in the shadow of Lochner and Dicey; B The allure and limits of existing interpretive approaches; 1 Interpretivism; 2 Principles, balancing, and proportionality; 3 Deliberative democracy; 4 The minimum-core approach; 5 Institutional reform approach; 6 South African reasonableness; IV Conclusion; PART II A theory of judicial restraint.
- 5 Institutional approaches to judicial restraintI Introduction; II Formalist approaches; A The distinction between law and politics; B The principle/policy distinction; C Justiciability; III Institutional approaches; A The rising tide of institutionalism; B General features of institutional approaches; Acceptance of uncertainty and judicial fallibility.; Concern with consequences and systemic effect.; Rights as prima facie claims subject to balancing.; Inter-institutional comity and collaboration.; Incrementalism.; C Two paths diverge: restrictive vs. contextual institutionalism.