Optimal Regulation and the Law of International Trade : the Interface between the Right to Regulate and WTO Law / Boris Rigod.
Are the limitations imposed on World Trade Organization (WTO) members' right to regulate efficient? This is a question that is only scarcely, if ever, analysed in existing literature. Boris Rigod aims to provide an answer to this fundamental concern. Using the tools of economic analysis and in...
Saved in:
| Online Access: |
Full Text (via ProQuest) |
|---|---|
| Main Author: | |
| Other title: | Optimal Regulation & the Law of International Trade. |
| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2015.
|
| Series: | Cambridge international trade and economic law ;
no. 18. |
| Subjects: |
MARC
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| 246 | 3 | |a Optimal Regulation & the Law of International Trade. | |
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| 490 | 1 | |a Cambridge International Trade and Economic Law ; |v no. 18. | |
| 500 | |a Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 15 Dec 2015) | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a Cover; Half-title page; Series page; Title page; Copyright page; Contents; Figures; Tables; Foreword; Acknowledgements; Table of cases; Introduction; Part I Optimal regulation and international trade law -- theory; 1 Introduction to Part I; 2 Optimal regulation; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The socially optimal level of regulation; 2.3 Costs and benefits; 2.4 Optimal regulation and incertitude; 2.5 Conclusion; 3 Deviations from optimal regulation; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Market power; 3.3 Public choice, lobby power and regulatory capture; 3.4 Systemic biases and public risk perception; 3.5 Conclusion 4 Deviations from optimal regulation and the role of international trade agreements4.1 The economic rationale for trade agreements; 4.2 The economic rationale for regulating domestic instruments; 4.3 The economic rationale for the SPS and the TBT Agreement; 4.4 Conclusion; 5 Conclusion on Part I; Part II Optimal regulation and international trade law -- application; 6 Introduction to Part II; 7 Domestic regulation and the GATT; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 Article III:4 GATT; 7.3 Article XX GATT; 7.4 Conclusion on GATT case law; 8 Domestic regulation and the TBT Agreement; 8.1 Introduction 4 Deviations from optimal regulation and the role of international trade agreements4.1 The economic rationale for trade agreements; 4.2 The economic rationale for regulating domestic instruments; 4.3 The economic rationale for the SPS and the TBT Agreement; 4.4 Conclusion; 5 Conclusion on Part I; Part II Optimal regulation and international trade law -- application; 6 Introduction to Part II; 7 Domestic regulation and the GATT; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 Article III:4 GATT; 7.3 Article XX GATT; 7.4 Conclusion on GATT case law; 8 Domestic regulation and the TBT Agreement; 8.1 Introduction. | |
| 520 | |a Are the limitations imposed on World Trade Organization (WTO) members' right to regulate efficient? This is a question that is only scarcely, if ever, analysed in existing literature. Boris Rigod aims to provide an answer to this fundamental concern. Using the tools of economic analysis and in particular the concept of economic efficiency as a benchmark, the author states that domestic regulatory measures should only be subject to scrutiny by WTO bodies when they cause negative international externalities through terms of trade manipulations. He then suggests that WTO law, applied by the WTO judiciary can prevent WTO members from attaining optimal levels of regulation. By applying a law and economics methodology, Rigod provides an innovative solution to the problem of how to reconcile members' regulatory autonomy and WTO rules as well as offering a novel analytical framework for assessing domestic regulations in the light of WTO law. | ||
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