Consciousness, function, and representation / Ned Block.
Annotation
Saved in:
| Online Access: |
Full Text (via ProQuest) |
|---|---|
| Main Author: | |
| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge, Mass. ; London :
MIT,
©2007.
©2007. |
| Series: | Collected papers ;
v. 1. |
| Subjects: |
Table of Contents:
- 1. Functionalism
- 2. What is functionalism?
- 3. What psychological states are not, with J. Fodor
- 4. Troubles with functionalism
- 5. What intuitions about Homunculi Do Not Sho
- 6. Consciousness
- 7. Review of Daniel Dennett, consciousness explained
- 8. What is Dennett's theory a theory of?
- 9. On a confusion about a function of consciousness
- 10. How many concepts of consciousness?
- 11. Biology versus computation in the study of consciousness
- 12. Ridiculing social constructivism about phenomenal consciousness
- 13. Concepts of consciousness
- 14. How not to find the neural correlate of consciousness
- 15. Paradox and cross-purposes in recent work on consciousness
- 16. Spatial perception via tactile sensation
- 17. Two neural correlates of consciousness
- 18. Review of Alva Noe¿, action in perception
- 19. Are absent qualia impossible?
- 20. The harder problem of consciousness
- 21. Max Black's objection to mind-body identity
- 22. Qualia
- 23. Inverted earth
- 24. Mental paint
- 25. Sexism, racism, ageism, and the nature of consciousness
- 26. Is experiencing just representing?
- 27. Bodily sensations as an obstacle for representationism.