Making multicandidate elections more democratic [electronic resource] / Samuel Merrill, III.
This book addresses a significant area of applied social-choice theory--the evaluation of voting procedures designed to select a single winner from a field of three or more candidates. Such procedures can differ strikingly in the election outcomes they produce, the opportunities for manipulation tha...
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Full Text (via ProQuest) |
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| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
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Princeton, N.J. :
Princeton University Press,
©1988.
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| Series: | Princeton legacy library.
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Table of Contents:
- Frontmatter
- CONTENTS
- LIST OF FIGURES
- LIST OF TABLES
- PREFACE
- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
- CHAPTER 1. Multicandidate Elections: Choosing a Winner
- CHAPTER 2. Condorcet Efficiency
- CHAPTER 3. Social-Utility Efficiency
- CHAPTER 4. The Effect of Alternative Spatial Models on Condorcet and Social-Utility Efficiency
- CHAPTER 5. Strategic Voting under Plurality Electoral Systems: Decisions under Uncertainty and under Risk
- CHAPTER 6. Strategic Voting and Its Effects on Condorcet Efficiency
- CHAPTER 7. Strategic Voting for Approval Balloting under Alternative Decision Rules
- CHAPTER 8. Empirical Estimates for Single-Vote Plurality and Approval Voting
- CHAPTER 9. Other Criteria for Assessing Voting Systems
- CHAPTER 10. Conclusions
- APPENDIX A.A Statistical Model for Condorcet Efficiency
- APPENDIX B. Justification of the Shepsle Utility Function
- APPENDIX C. Proofs of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2
- APPENDIX D. Simulation Results for Approval Balloting with Alternative Decision Rules
- APPENDIX E. Characterization of the Potentially Uniquely Optimal Strategies as Extreme Points of the Permissible Set of Strategies
- APPENDIX F. Derivation of the Standard-Score Voting System
- GLOSSARY
- BIBLIOGRAPHY
- INDEX
- Backmatter.