Multinational firms and the theory of international trade / James R. Markusen.
Despite the importance of multinational firms in international economics, theoretical and empirical research on these firms has generally been conducted separately from that on international trade. This text provides a comprehensive integration of the two fields.
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Language: | English |
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Cambridge, Mass. :
MIT Press,
℗♭2002.
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Table of Contents:
- Technology, Costs, and Market Structure
- Statistics, Stylized Facts, and Basic Concepts
- A Partial-Equilibrium, Single-Firm Model of Plant Location
- International Duopoly with Endogenous Market Structures
- Incumbency, Preemption, and Persistence
- A General-Equilibrium Oligopoly Model of Horizontal Multinationals
- A General-Equilibrium Monopolistic-Competition Model of Horizontal Multinationals
- The Knowledge-Capital Model
- Extensions to the Knowledge-Capital Model: Trade versus Affiliate Production, Factor-Price Effects, and Welfare Effects of Trade and Investment Liberalization
- Traded Intermediate Inputs and Vertical Multinationals
- Empirical Estimation and Testing
- Estimating the Knowledge-Capital Model
- Production for Export versus Local Sale
- Discriminating among Alternative Models of the Multinational
- Internalization
- A Reputation Model of Internalization
- A Learning Model of Internalization, with Applications to Contract and Intellectual-Property-Rights Enforcement
- An Asymmetric-Information Model of Internalization
- Technical Appendices
- Preface to Technical Appendices
- Stop Avoiding Inequalities and Complementarity Problems: A Simple Partial-Equilibrium Model Illustrating the GAMS MCP Solver
- Who's Afraid of Applied GE Modeling? A General-Equilibrium Version of Appendix 1 Using the MCP Solver
- Doing It the Easy Way: General-Equilibrium Problem of Appendix 2 Using the MPS/GE Subsystem of GAMS
- Fun with Sets and Conditionals: GAMS Program Generating the Nash Equilibria in Figures 3.6 and 3.7.