The later Wittgenstein and moral philosophy / Benjamin De Mesel.
This book shows that Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophical methods can be fruitfully applied to several problems in contemporary moral philosophy. The author considers Wittgenstein's ethical views and addresses such topics as meta-ethics, objectivity in ethics and moral perception. Rea...
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Full Text (via Springer) |
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cham, Switzerland :
Springer,
[2018]
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| Series: | Nordic Wittgenstein studies ;
v. 4. |
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Table of Contents:
- Intro; Acknowledgements; Contents; Original Places of Publication; Chapter 1: Introduction; 1.1 Wittgenstein's Ethical Views; 1.1.1 The Problem ofScarcity; 1.1.2 How toGet Clearer onWittgenstein's Ethical Views; 1.2 Wittgenstein's Ethical Views andHis Later Philosophy; 1.3 Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy andContemporary Moral Philosophy; 1.4 Structure andOverview oftheBook; 1.4.1 Part I. Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy; 1.4.2 Part II. Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy andHis Ethical Views; 1.4.3 Part III. Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy andContemporary Moral Philosophy; References.
- Part I: Wittgenstein's Later PhilosophyChapter 2: On Wittgenstein's Comparison ofPhilosophical Methods toTherapies; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The Illness: Are Philosophical Questions Illnesses?; 2.3 The Patient andtheTherapist: Are They Philosophers?; 2.4 The Therapies: Are They Psychological?; 2.5 The Ideal ofHealth: TheEnd ofPhilosophy?; 2.6 Conclusion; References; Chapter 3: Surveyable Representations, the'Lecture onEthics', andMoral Philosophy; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 The Concept ofaSurveyable Representation: Two Interpretations.
- 3.3 The Concept ofaSurveyable Representation: AThird Interpretation3.4 The 'Lecture onEthics' asaSurveyable Representation; 3.5 Are Surveyable Representations Useful forContemporary Moral Philosophy?; References; Part II: Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy and His Ethical Views; Chapter 4: Wittgenstein, Meta-ethics, andtheSubject Matter ofMoral Philosophy; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 'Ethics Has No Particular Subject Matter'; 4.3 'There Is andCan BeNo Such Thing asMeta-ethics'; 4.4 'A Classification by Use Rather than by Subject Matter'
- 4.5 'Ethics Is aPervasive Dimension ofLife Rather thanaDistinguishable Region or Strand ofIt'4.6 Conclusion; References; Chapter 5: Wittgenstein andObjectivity inEthics. AReply toBrandhorst; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Brandhorst's Arguments; 5.2.1 In aDifferent Way, Different Kinds, inaDifferent Sense; 5.2.2 No View fromNowhere; 5.2.3 There Is aLanguage-Game inWhich theExpression Has aUse; 5.2.4 A Deflationary Conception, No Metaphysical Depth; 5.2.5 With aCertain Conception ofX, WeAlso Obtain aConception ofaRelated Notion Y; 5.2.6 The Analogy toLogic andMathematics.
- 5.3 Arguments forObjectivity?5.3.1 In aDifferent Way, Different Kinds, inaDifferent Sense; 5.3.2 No View fromNowhere; 5.3.3 There Is aLanguage-Game inWhich theExpression Has aUse; 5.3.4 A Deflationary Conception, No Metaphysical Depth; 5.3.5 With aCertain Conception ofX, WeAlso Obtain aConception ofaRelated Notion Y; 5.3.6 The Analogy toLogic andMathematics; 5.4 Brandhorst's Conception ofObjectivity; 5.5 How Brandhorst Reads Wittgenstein onObjectivity; 5.6 Conclusion; References; Part III: Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy and Contemporary Moral Philosophy.