Our knowledge of the law : objectivity and practice in legal theory / George Pavlakos.

In the long-standing debate between positivism and non-positivism, legal validity has always been a subject of controversy. While positivists deny that moral values play any role in the determination of legal validity, non-positivists affirm the opposite thesis. In departing from this narrow point o...

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Bibliographic Details
Online Access: Full Text (via ProQuest)
Main Author: Pavlakos, George
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford ; Portland, Or. : Hart Pub., 2007.
Subjects:
Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Acknowledgements
  • TOC36;Contents
  • Introduction
  • The Problem
  • The Practice Theory of Law
  • The Philosophy of Pragmatic Rationalism
  • Plan of the Book
  • Part One The Grounds of Knowledge
  • CH36;1 Knowledge and Objectivity
  • 146;1 Introduction
  • 146;2 Objectivity as Asymmetry
  • 146;3 Conceptions of Objectivity
  • 146;4 Wittgenstein8217;s Idea of Grammar
  • CH36;2 Objectivity and Grammar
  • 246;1 Introduction
  • 246;2 Intentional Realism
  • 246;3 An Anti45;representationalist Theory of Content
  • 246;4 Mind45;independence and Realism
  • 246;5 Inferentialism and Truth
  • 246;6 Grammar44; Criteria and the Need for Practice
  • CH36;3 Grammar and Rule45;following
  • 346;1 Introduction
  • 346;2 Rule45;following and Content
  • 346;3 Conceptions of Practice
  • 346;4 Beyond Mind45;World Dualism
  • 346;5 Meaning44; Use and Truth
  • CH36;4 Practice44; Normativity and Reasons
  • 446;1 Introduction
  • 446;2 Reasons and the Reflexive Character of Practice
  • 446;3 Grammar as the Fundamental Practice
  • 446;4 Grammar44; Persons and Autonomy
  • 446;5 Pragmatic Rationalism
  • 446;6 Where does Law Fit in All This63;
  • Part Two Knowledge and Legal Theory
  • CH36;5 Conventionalism and the Grammarof Law
  • 546;1 Introduction
  • 546;2 Conceptual Analysis and the Grammar of Law
  • 546;3 The External and the Internal Aspect of Rules58; Legal Theory8217;s Split Personality
  • 546;4 Two Criticisms
  • 546;5 Conclusion
  • CH36;6 Interpretivism and the Menace of Essentialism
  • 646;1 Introduction
  • 646;2 Interpretivism and the Depth of Practice
  • 646;3 Rationalist Objectivity
  • 646;4 Anti45;rationalism and the Rejection of Grammar
  • 646;5 Normativity of Practice
  • CH36;7 The Practice Theory of Law
  • 746;1 Introduction
  • 746;2 Failure of Conventionalism and Interpretivism
  • 746;3 Law as a Constraint45;generating Concept
  • 746;4 Conditions of Normativity
  • 746;5 Depicting Legal Norms I58; the General Rules of Discourse
  • 746;6 Depicting Legal Norms II58; Law as a Special Case ofMorality
  • Concluding Remarks
  • The Practice Theory of Law in a Nutshell
  • Outcomes and Some Applications
  • Bibliography
  • IDX36;Index
  • Last Page.