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Perceptual experience / Christopher S. Hill.

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Christopher S. Hill argues that perceptual experience constitutively involves representations of worldly items, and that the relevant form of representation can be explained in broadly biological terms. He then maintains that the representational contents of perceptual experiences are perceptual app...

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Bibliographic Details
Online Access: Full Text (via ProQuest)
Main Author: Hill, Christopher S. (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2022.
Edition:First edition.
Subjects:
Perception (Philosophy)
Experience.
Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Perceptual Experience
  • Copyright
  • Dedication
  • Contents
  • Preface
  • Acknowledgments
  • List of Figures
  • Epigraph
  • 1: Representationalism
  • I. Introduction
  • II. Goals
  • III. Fixing Ideas about Perception and Experience
  • IV. Teleosemantics Plus Representational Pluralism
  • V. Selectionist Teleosemantics, Learning, and Cummins Teleosemantics
  • VI. Two Objections to the Foregoing Picture
  • VII. Conclusion
  • 2: Appearance and Reality I
  • I. Introduction
  • II. Introspective Grounds for Perceptual Relativity
  • III. Experimental Grounds for Relativity.
  • IV. Appearance Properties
  • V. Thouless Sizes
  • VI. More on Thouless Properties
  • VII. Objective Properties
  • VIII. Conclusion
  • 3: Appearance and Reality II
  • I. Introduction
  • II. Alternative Accounts of Visual Appearances
  • III. Aspects of Perceptual Relativity Due to Peripheral Sense Organs
  • IV. Aspects of Perceptual Relativity Due to Attention
  • V. Thouless Properties and Causal Theories of Representation
  • VI. Generalizing from Vision to Other Perceptual Modalities
  • VII. Appearance and Reality in Audition
  • VIII. Appearance and Reality in Touch.
  • IX. Appearance and Reality in Olfaction
  • X. Conclusion
  • 4: Perceptual Awareness of Particulars
  • I. Introduction
  • II. Particularism vs Existentialism
  • III. An Argument for Existentialism
  • IV. Arguments for Particularism
  • V. Awareness of Particulars
  • VI. The Nature of Objects of Perceptual Awareness
  • VII. A Dual Systems Account of Object Awareness
  • VIII. A Unified Account of Object Awareness
  • IX. Awareness of Objects Qua Members of Kinds
  • X. Conclusion
  • 5: Perceptual Phenomenology
  • I. Introduction
  • II. Dualism
  • III. Phenomenal Representationalism.
  • IV. Reasons for Representationalist Accounts of Awareness
  • V. An Objection to Phenomenal Representationalism
  • VI. Conclusion
  • APPENDIX I: The Phenomenology of Conscious Thought
  • APPENDIX II: The Phenomenology of Moods and Emotions
  • 6: A Quasi-Perceptualist Account of Pain Experience
  • I. Introduction
  • II. Fixing Ideas
  • III. The Damage Detection System and Its Relation to Pain
  • IV. Six Concerns about This Theory of Pain
  • V. Hurting
  • VI. Awareness of Pain and Perceptual Awareness
  • VII. Conclusion
  • 7: Perceptual Consciousness
  • I. Introduction
  • II. The Autonomy Thesis.
  • III. A Metaphysical Argument for the Autonomy Thesis
  • IV. A Fourth Argument for Autonomy
  • V. The Categorical Base Hypothesis
  • VI. Phenomenal Consciousness
  • VII. Proposals about P-Consciousness
  • VIII. The Second-OrderTheory of P-Consciousness
  • IX. The Adverbial Theory of P-Consciousness
  • X. The Categorical Base Theory of P-Consciousness
  • XI. Conclusion
  • 8: Percepts and Concepts
  • I. Introduction
  • II. A Theory of Propositional Attitudes
  • III. Percepts are Metaphysically Independent of Concepts.

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