Implicit incentives in international joint ventures [electronic resource] : an experimental study / Fan Wu ; with a foreword by Birgitta Wolff.
Managers in international joint ventures work with resources contributed by investors from multiple nationalities. Fan Wu shows through a series of experimental studies among students and managers from China, South Korea, Germany, and the USA that cultural affinity between the manager and one of the...
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Full Text (via Springer) |
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| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiesbaden :
Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden,
2012.
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| Edition: | 1st ed. |
| Series: | Gabler research.
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Table of Contents:
- Foreword; Preface; Table of Contents; List of Tables; List of Figures; List of Abbreviations; List of Variables; 1. Implicit incentives of international joint venture managers
- an introduction; 2. Joint venture manager as a common agency; 2.1 Delegation of management to a joint venture manager; 2.1.1 Importance of joint venture manager's loyalty as a consequence of incomplete contracting; 2.1.2 Location specificity of joint venture assets; 2.1.3 Implicit incentives for an international joint venture manager; 2.1.4 Cultural affinity as an implicit incentive.
- 2.1.5 Career perspective as an implicit incentive2.2 Choice of research methods; 2.3 Countries in the samples; 3. Expert interviews among Sino-German jointventure and parent firm managers; 3.1 Questionnaire development and pilot interviews; 3.2 Selection of the sample and contact to the companies; 3.3 The interview procedure, data input, cross inspection and conversion; 3.4 Interview results on the influence of nationality and career perspectives; 3.4.1 The influence of nationality on SGJV managers' decisions; 3.4.2 The career perspective of SGJV managers.
- 4. Cultural affinity of managers of internationaljoint ventures: an experimental study4.1 The model, the equilibrium, and the hypotheses; 4.1.1 The model; 4.1.2 Game-theoretic equilibrium (payoff-maximizing agents); 4.2 Experimental hypotheses, design and procedure; 4.3 Data analysis; 4.3.1 Managers' allocation decisions
- Hypothesis 1a; 4.3.2 Investors' investment decisions
- Hypothesis 1b; 4.4 Summary and discussion of the cultural affinityexperiments; 5. Career perspective for managers of internationaljoint venture managers: an experimental study; 5.1 The model and the equilibrium.
- 5.1.1 The model with ex ante offers5.1.2 Game-theoretic equilibrium (payoff-maximizing agents); 5.1.3 Alternative timing of the offers: the model with ex post offers; 5.2 Experimental hypotheses, design and procedure; 5.3 Data analysis; 5.3.1 Managers' allocation decisions
- Hypotheses 2a and 3a; 5.3.2 Investors' transfer payment offers
- Hypotheses 2b and 3b; 5.3.3 Overbidding for the manager's favor; 5.4 Summary and discussion of the career perspectiveexperiments; 6. The effects of former acquaintance and work experience: alternative samples.
- 6.1 Social distance and demographical characteristics of students and managers6.1.1 Social distance due to the players' former acquaintance; 6.1.2 Differences between students and managers; 6.2 The experimental model and equilibrium; 6.3 Experiments with Group Student and MBA samples; 6.4 Results from experiments with the Group Student and MBA samples; 6.4.1 Managers' allocation decisions; 6.4.2 Investors' transfer payment offers; 6.5 Results from the discussion with the MBA subjects; 6.6 Summary and discussion of the alternative samples; 7. Managerial implications and research outlook.