Can a safeguards accountancy system really detect an unauthorized removal [electronic resource]
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Online Access: |
Online Access |
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Format: | Government Document Electronic eBook |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Oak Ridge, Tenn. :
distributed by the Office of Scientific and Technical Information, U.S. Dept. of Energy,
1981.
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Subjects: |
Abstract: | Theoretical investigations and system studies indicate safeguards material balance data from reprocessing plants can be used to detect unauthorized removals. Plant systems have been modeled and simulated data used to demonstrate the techniques. But how sensitive are the techniques when used with actual plant data. What is the effect of safeguards applications on plant operability. Can safeguards be acceptable to plant operators, and are there any benefits to be derived. The Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) has been devoted to answering these and other questions over the past several years. A computerized system of near-real-time accounting and in-process inventory has been implemented and demonstrated during actual plant test runs. Measured inventories and hourly material balance closures have been made to assess safeguards in an operating plant application. The tests have culminated in actual removals of material from the operating plant to investigate the response and measure the sensitivity of the safeguards and data evaluation system. |
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Item Description: | Published through SciTech Connect. 11/01/1981. "agns-35900-conf-164" " conf-820415-1" "DE82007159" 4. annual symposium on harmonization and standardization, Petten, Netherlands, 27 Apr 1982. Ehinger, M.H.; Ellis, J.H. Allied-General Nuclear Services, Barnwell, SC (USA) |
Physical Description: | Pages: 8 : digital, PDF file. |