Credible threats in negotiations : a game-theoretic approach / by Harold Houba and Wilko Bolt.
The modern theory of threats in bargaining situations is presented in a unified and systematic treatment that puts the existing literature in a new perspective. Harold Houba and Wilko Bolt provide a masterful synthesis of the fundamental results obtained in the rapidly expanding game-theoretic liter...
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| Online Access: |
Full Text (via ProQuest) |
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| Main Author: | |
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Boston :
Kluwer Academic Publishers,
©2002.
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| Series: | Theory and decision library. Game theory, mathematical programming, and operations research ;
v. 32. |
| Subjects: |
| Summary: | The modern theory of threats in bargaining situations is presented in a unified and systematic treatment that puts the existing literature in a new perspective. Harold Houba and Wilko Bolt provide a masterful synthesis of the fundamental results obtained in the rapidly expanding game-theoretic literature. The relative impacts of the fundamental forces on the bargaining outcome are discussed and related to the visions expressed by Nobel-laureate John Nash. Many topics -such as robustness of the results with respect to the diversity of known bargaining procedures, the role of commitment and policy bargaining situations- receive their most extensive treatment to date. Credible Threats in Negotiations is suitable as a textbook for graduate students in economic theory and other social sciences and a necessity as a resource for scholars interested in bargaining situations. |
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| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (xxi, 319 pages) : illustrations. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 311-316) and index. |
| ISBN: | 0306475391 9780306475399 6610200262 9786610200269 |
| Source of Description, Etc. Note: | Print version record. |