Strategic interactions between an independent central bank and a myopic government with government debt / prepared by Sven Jari Stehn and David Vines.

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Online Access: Full Text (via ProQuest)
Main Authors: Stehn, Sven Jari (Author), Vines, David (Author)
Corporate Author: International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Department
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: [Washington, D.C.?] : International Monetary Fund, ©2009.
©2008.
Series:IMF working paper ; WP/08/164.
Subjects:
Table of Contents:
  • I. Introduction; II. The Model; A. Consumers; B. Price Setting; C. Aggregate Demand and Fiscal Policy; D. The System; E. Social Welfare; F. Policy Objectives; G. Calibration; III. Solving for Optimal Policy; A. Cooperative Policy; B. Non-Cooperative Policy under Discretion; IV. Optimal Policy when Lump-Sum Taxes are Available; A. Cooperative Policy; 1. Commitment; 2. Discretion; B. Non-Cooperative Policy with a Myopic Fiscal Authority; 1. Nash; 2. Fiscal Leadership; 3. Robustness; V. Optimal Policy when Lump-Sum Taxes are not Available; A. Cooperative Policy; 1. Commitment.
  • 2. DiscretionB. Non-Cooperative Policy with a Myopic Fiscal Authority; 1. Nash; 2. Fiscal Leadership; C. Robustness; VI. Optimal Institutions; A.A Debt Penalty; B.A Conservative Central Bank; VII. Conclusion; Appendix; A. Social Welfare; B. Policy Myopia; C. Solving the Model; 1. Optimal Cooperative Policy ; 2. Optimal Non-Cooperative Policy under Discretion; References; Tables; 1. Optimal policy simulations for a transitory cost-push shock; Figures; 1. Dynamic responses to a transitory cost-push shock under optimal policy.