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Metaphilosophy and Free Will.

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Why is debate over the free will problem so intractable? In this broad and stimulating look at the philosophical enterprise, Richard Double uses the free will controversy to build on the subjectivist conclusion he developed in The Non-Reality of Free Will (OUP 1991). Double argues that variousviews...

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Bibliographic Details
Online Access: Full Text (via ProQuest)
Main Author: Double, Richard
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Cary : Oxford University Press, 1996.
Subjects:
Free will and determinism.
Methodology.
Free will and determinism
Methodology

MARC

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505 0 |a 1 Introduction; 1. Free Will Subjectivism and Metaphilosophy; 2. An Example of the Importance of Metaphilosophy; 3. A Provisional Definition of Free Choice; 4. Overview of the Book; I: THE FREE WILL PROBLEM AS A PROBLEM IN METAPHILOSOPHY; 2 Metaphilosophies; 1. What Is Philosophy For?; 2. Desires-for-Philosophy and Conceptions of Philosophy; 3. Four Metaphilosophies; 4. The Importance of Having a Metaphilosophy; 5. The Unprovability of Metaphilosophy: Two Reasons; 6. Three Objections to the Relativity of Metaphilosophies; 7. Conclusion; 3 Intermediate-Level Philosophical Principles. 
505 8 |a 1. Five Pairs of Intermediate Principles2. The Unprovability of Intermediate-Level Principles; 3. The Interplay of Metaphilosophies, Intermediate Principles, and Lower-Level Theories; 4. Why Adopt Philosophy as Continuous with Science?; 5. Conclusion; 4 How the Free Will Debate Depends on Metaphilosophy (I); 1. Reasons for Believing in Free Will; 2. The Burden-of-Proof Issue; 3. How Far May Philosophers 'Go' to Accommodate Free Will?; 4. Strawson's Subjectivist Account of Blame; 5. The Debate over Dual Rationality; 5 How the Free Will Debate Depends on Metaphilosophy (II). 
505 8 |a 1. The Analogy between the Metaphysics of Ethics and the Metaphysics of Free Will2. Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument; 3. Frankfurt's Principle of Alternative Possibilities; 4. Is Equal Proof Needed in All Areas of Philosophy?; 5. Standard and Non-Standard Views of Moral Responsibility; 6. Conclusion; II: FREE WILL FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF PHILOSOPHY AS CONTINUOUS WITH SCIENCE; 6 How to Frame the Free Will Problem; 1. A Radical Approach to Free Will; 2. Four Free Will Theories; 3. Another Theory; 4. Conclusion; 7 The Fragmentation of Free Will; 1. The Unity Objection. 
505 8 |a 2. The Fragmentation-Is-No-Problem Objection3. Two Preliminary Reasons to Reject Both Types of the Fragmentation-Is-No-Problem Objection; 4. Reasons to Reject the Bald Example; 5. Reasons to Reject Cockburn's Move; 6. Mele's Objection; 7. Conclusion; 8 Free Will Is a Moral Concept; 1. What Does It Mean to Call Free Choice a Moral Term?; 2. A Preliminary Reason for Thinking That Free Choice Is Moral; 3. The Open-Question Argument: Goodness and Freeness; 4. The Analogy with Moral Facts: Freeness Facts Have No Explanatory Power; 5. The Goodness of Ultimacy; 6. The Dispute over Magnanimity. 
505 8 |a 7. Conclusion9 Hume's Principle: The Subjectivity of Moral Responsibility and Free Will; 1. Defining the Key Terms; 2. Why Hume's Principle Implies That Ascriptions of Moral Responsibility Cannot Be True; 3. Why Hume's Principle Implies That Free Choice Is a Moral Concept; 4. Conclusion; 10 Conclusion; 1. Where We Are; 2. Philosophical Consequences; 3. Consequences for Persons; References; Index; A; B; C; D; E; F; G; H; I; J; K; L; M; N; O; P; Q; R; S; T; U; V; W; Z. 
520 |a Why is debate over the free will problem so intractable? In this broad and stimulating look at the philosophical enterprise, Richard Double uses the free will controversy to build on the subjectivist conclusion he developed in The Non-Reality of Free Will (OUP 1991). Double argues that variousviews about free will--e.g., compatibilism, incompatibilism, and even subjectivism--are compelling if, and only if, we adopt supporting metaphilosophical views. Because metaphilosophical considerations are not provable, we cannot show any free will theory to be most reasonable. Metaphilosophy andFree Will. 
650 0 |a Free will and determinism. 
650 0 |a Methodology. 
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650 7 |a Methodology  |2 fast 
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