G.E. Moore: Early Philosophical Writings / edited by Thomas Baldwin, Consuelo Preti.
G.E. Moore's fame as a philosopher rests on his ethics of love and beauty, which inspired Bloomsbury, and on his 'common sense' certainties which challenge abstract philosophical theory. Behind this lies his critical engagement with Kant's idealist philosophy, which is published...
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| Language: | English |
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Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2011.
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Table of Contents:
- Cover; Half-title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Preface; Abbreviations and notes; Abbreviations; Notes; Editors' introduction; I Moore on his dissertations; II Early life; III The Trinity College Prize Fellowship competition; IV Six years as a Prize Fellow: 1898-1904; V Intellectual background; V.1 British idealism; V.2 Mental science; V.3 Sidgwick; VI Moore's debate with Kant; VI. 1 Moore's introductions; VI. 2 Freedom; VI. 3 Reason; VI. 4 Ethical conclusions; VI. 5 The chronology of kant's ethical writings; VII Moore's examiners; VII. 1 Caird; VII. 2 Bosanquet; VIII The text of the dissertations.
- VIII. 1 The manuscripts1897 Dissertation; 1898 Dissertation; VIII. 2 The 1898 dissertation and 'the nature of judgment'; VIII. 3 From 1897 to 1898: how moore changed his dissertation; References; The 1897 dissertation The Metaphysical Basis of Ethics; Preface; Introduction; Chapter I: Freedom; Contents of chapter i; Chapter I: Freedom; Kant a declared determinist. freedom not 'naturally' possible; Meaning and ambiguity of causality. ding an sich as free cause; Ding an sich implies positive knowledge of real free cause, which is no cause.
- Reality thus has transcendental freedom. but kant applies it to 'will''Liberty of indifference' an attempt to find in the world of experience an absolutely self-caused cause. impossibility of completely predicting human action; Libertarianism means uncaused choosing. no defence of it.; Sense in which empirical objects have 'self' and are free; Notion of 'organism', as possessed of freedom, untenable; Kant's freedom takes account of freedom, in only sense, in which we have found it to belong to natural objects, but his freedom does not belong to 'will' either.
- Reasons why he thought it did. confusions exposed'Pure will' impossible as implying time. no practical freedom; Kant's connection of freedom with 'end', vitiated by being referred to 'will'; Notion 'good' commonly connected with freedom, and really capable of connection with transcendental freedom; Appendix: Professor Sidgwick's Hedonism; I; II; Examiners' reports on the 1897 dissertation; H.S. on G.E. Moore, Dissertation on the Metaphysical Basis of Ethics; Report on Mr. Moore's Essay; The 1898 dissertation The Metaphysical Basis of Ethics; Preface; Table of contents; Introduction.
- Chapter I: On the meaning of -Reason' in KantChapter II: Reason; Chapter III: The meaning of F̀€reedom' in Kant; Chapter IV: Freedom; Chapter V: Ethical Conclusions; Appendix on the Chronology of Kant's Ethical Writings; Examiner's report on the 1898 dissertation; Report on a Dissertation entitled 'The Metaphysical Basis of Ethics' by Mr. G.E. Moore; Index.