The politics of authoritarian rule / Milan W. Svolik, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.
"What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule -- the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule -- the problem of a...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
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Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
[2012]
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| Series: | Cambridge studies in comparative politics.
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| 100 | 1 | |a Svolik, Milan W., |d 1977- |e author. |1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCjD744VhQM9MPbqYDbC38K | |
| 245 | 1 | 4 | |a The politics of authoritarian rule / |c Milan W. Svolik, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge : |b Cambridge University Press, |c [2012] | |
| 264 | 4 | |c ©2012 | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (228 pages) | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a volume |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 347 | |a data file | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Cambridge studies in comparative politics | |
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index. | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a 1. Introduction: the anatomy of dictatorship -- 2. The world of authoritarian politics -- Part I. The problem of authoritarian power-sharing. 3. And then there was one!: Authoritarian power-sharing and the path to personal dictatorship -- 4. When and why institutions contribute to authoritarian stability: commitment, monitoring, and collective action problems in authoritarian power-sharing -- Part II. The problem of authoritarian control. 5. Moral hazard in authoritarian repression and the origins of military dictatorships -- 6. Why authoritarian parties?: the regime party as an instrument of co-optation and control -- 7. Conclusion: incentives and institutions in authoritarian politics. | |
| 520 | |a "What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule -- the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule -- the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why elsewhere leadership changes are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis on institutions, leaders and ruling coalitions across dictatorships from 1946 to 2008"-- |c Provided by publisher | ||
| 588 | 0 | |a Print version record. | |
| 546 | |a English. | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Authoritarianism. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Authoritarianism |v Case studies. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Authoritarianism |2 fast | |
| 655 | 7 | |a Case studies |2 fast | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Svolik, Milan W., 1977- |t Politics of authoritarian rule. |d Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, ©2012 |z 9781107024793 |w (DLC) 2012012615 |w (OCoLC)786002522 |
| 830 | 0 | |a Cambridge studies in comparative politics. | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://colorado.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139176040 |z Full Text (via Cambridge) |
| 880 | 8 | |6 505-00/(S |a 4.2 THE ALLIES' COLLECTIVE-ACTION PROBLEMAND CREDIBLE POWER-SHARING -- 4.3 A FORMAL MODEL -- 4.3.1 Allies' Rebellion as a Collective-Action Problem -- 4.3.2 Authoritarian Power-Sharing without Institutions -- 4.3.3 Authoritarian Power-Sharing with Institutions -- 4.4 POWER-SHARING INSTITUTIONS ANDAUTHORITARIAN STABILITY -- 4.5 CONCLUSION: THE DISTINCTLY AUTHORITARIAN PURPOSEOF NOMINALLY DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN DICTATORSHIPS -- 4.6 APPENDIX: PROOFS -- The uniqueness of the equilibrium in Proposition 4.1. -- Comparative static results from Proposition 4.1. -- Forming a larger than minimum ruling coalition κ0. -- PART II THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITARIAN CONTROL -- 5 Moral Hazard in Authoritarian Repression and the Origins of Military Dictatorships -- 5.1 THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM IN AUTHORITARIAN REPRESSION -- 5.2 BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF MILITARY INTERVENTION -- 5.3 A FORMAL MODEL -- 5.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS -- 5.5 CONCLUSION: THE POLITICAL PRICE OFAUTHORITARIAN REPRESSION -- 5.6 APPENDIX I: PROOFS -- Comparative statics on α∗ and β∗. -- The government's equilibrium choice of the military's resources r∗. -- 5.7 APPENDIX II: MULTIPLE IMPUTATION -- 6 Why Authoritarian PartiesThe Regime Party as an Instrument of Co-optation and Control -- 6.1 THE LOGIC OF PARTY-BASED AUTHORITARIAN CO-OPTATION -- 6.1.1 Hierarchical Assignment of Service and Benefits -- 6.1.2 Political Control over Appointments -- 6.1.3 Selective Recruitment, Promotion, and Repression -- 6.2 REGIME PARTIES AND AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE -- 6.3 CONCLUSION: WHY AUTHORITARIAN REGIME PARTIES-- 7 Conclusion: Incentives and Institutions in Authoritarian Politics -- 7.1 WHY DICTATORS PRESIDE OVER POLICY DISASTERS. | |
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