Outsourcing the board : how board service providers can improve corporate governance / Stephen M. Bainbridge, M. Todd Henderson.
"In this groundbreaking work, Stephen Bainbridge and Todd Henderson change the conversation about corporate governance by examining the origins, roles, and performance of boards with a simple question in mind: why does the law require governance to be delivered through individual board members?...
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Full Text (via Cambridge) |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge [UK] ; New York, NY :
Cambridge University Press,
2018.
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| Subjects: |
Table of Contents:
- Machine generated contents note: Introduction: I. Corporate Boards: 1. A Brief History of the Board; 1.1. The Political Origins of Corporate Boards; 1.2. The Privatization of the Corporation and the Changing Role of the Board; 1.3. The Board's Evolving Modern Role; 1.4. Summary; 2: What do Boards do? ; 2.1. The Roles Played by the Modern Corporate Board; 2.2. Management; 2.3. Service; 2.4. Monitoring; 2.5. Diversity; 2.6. Overlapping Roles and the Crudeness of Categories; 2.7. Role Conflicts; 2.8. Evolution Over Time; 3. Grading Boards; 3.1. Public Perceptions; 3.2. Even Graded on a Curve, Boards Fail; 3.3. Boards Fail Even at Grading Themselves; 3.4. Showing Improvement; 3.5. But There's Still Room for Improvement; 4. Why Boards Fail; 4.1. Introduction; 4.2. Time Constraints; 4.3. Information Asymmetries; 4.4. Too Many Generalists; 4.5. Bad Incentives; 4.6. Boards Refuse to Lead; 4.7. Boards Lack Cohesiveness; 4.8. SOX Locked Boards into a One Size Fits All Model; II. The Board Service Provider: 5. Board Service Providers: The Basic Idea; 5.1. Introduction; 5.2. The Board Service Provider; 5.3. Appointment and Elections; 5.4. Composition and Function; 5.5. Compensation; 5.6. Liability; 5.7. Summary; 6. How BSPs Address the Pathologies of Modern Corporate Governance; 6.1. Managerial Hegemony Theory; 6.2. Class Hegemony Theory; 6.3. Resource Dependence Theory; 6.4. Stakeholder Theory; 6.5. Stewardship Theory; 6.6. Agency Theory; 6.7. Summary; 7. Incentivizing the BSP; 7.1. Compensation incentives; 7.2. Liability-based incentives; 7.3. Reputational incentives; 7.4. Exposure to market forces; 7.5. Measurability; III. Legal Issues: 8. BSPs and the Law; 8.1. Legal Obstacles to BSPs Under U.S. Federal and State Law; 8.2. The Law in Other Countries; 8.3. The Case for Changing the Law; 9. BSPs and the Emerging Federal Law of Corporations; 9.1. Director Independence; 9.2. BSPs and the CEO/Chair Duality Issue; 9.3. The Audit Committee; 9.4. Section 404 Internal Controls; 9.5. The Compensation Committee; 9.6. The Nominating Committee; IV. BSPs & the Frontiers of Corporate Governance: 10. BSPs and Proxy Access; 10.1. A Brief Overview of Proxy Access; 10.2. Proxy Access and BSPs; 11. The BSP as an alternative to quinquennial board elections; 11.1. Introduction; 11.2. The Quinquennial Election Proposal; 11.3. The Quinquennial Election and the BSP; 11.4. Quinquennial Elections and Mandatory Rotation of the BSP; 11.5. Summary; 12. The BSP in a Post-Monitoring Board World; 12.1. The Thickly Informed Board; 12.2. The BSP as Thickly Informed Board; 12.3. The Private Equity Analog; 12.4. Summary; V. Concluding Thoughts: 13. Anticipating Objections; 13.1. Overcoming the Status Quo Bias; 13.2. Reduced Accountability; 13.3. Loss of Personal Service; 13.4. Loss of Advantages of Group Decision Making; 13.5. BSPs will be Captured by Management; 13.6. BSP Incentives Inadequately Aligned to Shareholder Interests; 13.7. Isn't This Just One More Costly Intermediary? ; 13.8. Conflicts of Interest; 14. Conclusion.