Living Skepticism. Essays in Epistemology and Beyond
This book of original papers offers fresh approaches to skepticism-a topic in philosophy with a noble two-millennia history; and one that even inaugurated modern philosophy in Descartes's Meditations . Particularly with the rise of scientific forms or models of philosophy, skepticism today is o...
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Full Text (via ProQuest) |
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Main Author: | |
Other Authors: | |
Format: | Electronic eBook |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Boston :
BRILL,
2022.
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Series: | Brill Studies in Skepticism Ser.
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Subjects: |
Summary: | This book of original papers offers fresh approaches to skepticism-a topic in philosophy with a noble two-millennia history; and one that even inaugurated modern philosophy in Descartes's Meditations . Particularly with the rise of scientific forms or models of philosophy, skepticism today is often treated as a dead-end not worthy of serious reflection. In contrast to this prevailing attitude, the skepticisms discussed in these pages are alive . Here are assembled leading thinkers who claim at least some forms of skepticism to be true (e.g. skepticism about ethics or metaphysics) or insightful enough to be a lasting source of philosophical enlightenment and inspiration. |
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Item Description: | Description based upon print version of record. |
Physical Description: | 1 online resource (213 p.). |
Bibliography: | References -- Chapter 6 A Defense of Transcendental Arguments -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Transcendental Argument and the Refutation of Humean Skepticism -- 3 Philosophical vs Real Skepticism -- 4 Skepticism as Underdetermination -- 5 Skepticism as Underdetermination and A Posteriori Inferences -- 6 Transcendental Arguments and Objectivity -- 7 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 7 Content-Determinacy Skepticism and Phenomenal Intentionality -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Searle on Quine and Davidson -- 3 Updated Worries about Content-Determinacy -- 4 Searle on the Sources of Content-Determinacy |
ISBN: | 9789004525474 9004525475 |