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040116s2004 dcu ob 001 0 eng |
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20240412160504.8 |
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|a 2004615097
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|a (OCoLC)wbokr54047147
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|b eng
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|a HG3881.5.W57
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| 049 |
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|a GWRE
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Knack, Stephen F.
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| 245 |
1 |
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|a Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients /
|c Stephen Knack and Aminur Rahman.
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C. :
|b World Bank,
|c [2004]
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| 300 |
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|a 1 online resource.
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| 336 |
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|a text
|b txt
|2 rdacontent
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| 337 |
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|a computer
|b c
|2 rdamedia
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| 338 |
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|a online resource
|b cr
|2 rdacarrier
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| 490 |
1 |
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|a Policy research working paper ;
|v 3186
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| 500 |
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|a Title from title screen as viewed on January 16, 2004.
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| 500 |
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|a "January 15, 2004."
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| 504 |
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|a Includes bibliographical references.
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| 530 |
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|a Also available in print.
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3 |
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|a This paper analyzes the impact of donor fragmentation on the quality of government bureaucracy in aid-recipient nations. A formal model of a donor's decision to hire government administrators to manage donor-funded projects predicts that the number of administrators hired declines as the donor's share of other projects in the country increases, and as the donor's "altruism" (concern for the success of other donors' projects) increases. These hypotheses are supported by cross-country empirical tests using an index of bureaucratic quality available for aid-recipient nations over the 1982-2001 period. Declines in bureaucratic quality are associated with higher donor fragmentation (reflecting the presence of many donors, each with a small share of aid), and with smaller shares of aid coming from multilateral agencies, a proxy for donor "altruism." This paper--a product of Public Services, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to identify ways in which donors inadvertently undermine institutional development in aid recipient countries.
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| 650 |
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|a Economic assistance
|z Developing countries.
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| 650 |
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|a Bureaucracy
|z Developing countries.
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| 650 |
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|a Civil service
|z Developing countries.
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| 650 |
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|a Altruism
|z Developing countries.
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| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Altruism.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst00806239
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| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Bureaucracy.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst00841702
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| 650 |
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7 |
|a Civil service.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst00862730
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| 650 |
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7 |
|a Economic assistance.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst00901592
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| 651 |
|
7 |
|a Developing countries.
|2 fast
|0 (OCoLC)fst01242969
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Rahman, Aminur,
|d 1956-
|1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCjD7tXrfCKv9bg3CKJBdPP
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| 710 |
2 |
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|a World Bank.
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| 758 |
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|i has work:
|a Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients (Text)
|1 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PCH6BRPgmKgXk3YcgvRcybd
|4 https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/ontology/hasWork
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| 830 |
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|a Policy research working papers (Online) ;
|v 3186.
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| 856 |
4 |
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|u https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/14201
|z Full Text (via Open Knowledge Repository)
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| 915 |
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|a 7
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| 956 |
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|a World Bank Open Knowledge
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| 956 |
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|b World Bank Group: Open Knowledge Repository
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| 998 |
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|b New collection global.5644.245
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|a 92
|b COD
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| 952 |
f |
f |
|p Can circulate
|a University of Colorado Boulder
|b Online
|c Online
|d Online
|e HG3881.5.W57
|h Library of Congress classification
|i web
|
