Personal ontology : mystery and its consequences / Andrew Brenner, Hong Kong Baptist University.
"What are we? Are we, for example, souls, organisms, brains, or something else? This book discusses the main competing accounts of personal ontology that we are either souls, or we are composite physical objects of some sort, and includes a detailed discussion of the metaphysics of several afte...
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Full Text (via ProQuest) |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY :
Cambridge University Press,
2024.
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| Subjects: |
MARC
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| 100 | 1 | |a Brenner, Andrew Timothy, |d 1989- |e author. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Personal ontology : |b mystery and its consequences / |c Andrew Brenner, Hong Kong Baptist University. |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, United Kingdom ; |a New York, NY : |b Cambridge University Press, |c 2024. | |
| 264 | 4 | |c ©2024 | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (viii, 241 pages) | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a volume |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index. | ||
| 520 | |a "What are we? Are we, for example, souls, organisms, brains, or something else? This book discusses the main competing accounts of personal ontology that we are either souls, or we are composite physical objects of some sort, and includes a detailed discussion of the metaphysics of several afterlife scenarios"-- |c Provided by publisher. | ||
| 588 | |a Description based on online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on March 15, 2024). | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a Cover -- Half-title -- Title page -- Imprints page -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 What Is This Book About? -- 1.2 Composition -- 1.3 Composition as Identity -- 1.4 The Trilemma Again -- 1.5 Chapter Summaries -- 2 Arguments against Substance Dualism, Part 1 -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Parsimony-Based Arguments -- 2.3 The Argument from Causal Closure/Exclusion -- 2.4 The Argument from Conservation Laws -- 2.5 The Argument from the Correlation between Mental States and Brain States -- 2.6 Where Do Souls Come From? -- 2.7 How Do We Reidentify Immaterial Souls over Time? | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 3 Arguments against Substance Dualism, Part 2: Pairing Problems -- 3.1 Two Pairing Problems -- 3.2 Response 1: No Answer Required -- 3.3 Response 2: Composite Objects Are Located Where Their Parts Are Located -- 3.4 Response 3: This Composite Object Has These Things as Parts Because These Things Give Rise to, Create, or Ground This Composite Object -- 3.5 Response 4: The Pairing Problems Simply Illustrate a More General Problem Which Affects Everyone -- 3.6 Response 5: Mereological Antirealism -- 3.7 Conclusion -- 4 Arguments for Substance Dualism -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Modal Arguments | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 4.3 An Epistemic Argument for Substance Dualism -- 4.4 The Argument from the Alleged Fact That Facts Regarding Personal Identity Outstrip the Physical Facts -- 4.5 The Argument from Phenomenology and Intentionality -- 4.6 The Argument from the Unity of Consciousness -- 4.7 Lowe's Argument from Unity -- 4.8 The Argument from the Problem of the Many -- 5 Interlude: What Exactly Is the Difference between Our Being Immaterial Souls and Our Being Composite Physical Objects? -- 6 Nonself, Part 1: Arguments against Our Existence -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The Argument from Impermanence | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 6.3 The Argument from Lack of Control -- 6.4 The Neither One nor Many Argument -- 6.5 The Argument from Simplicity or Parsimony -- 7 Nonself, Part 2: The Self Exists -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Can We Perceive That the Self Exists? -- 7.3 Can We Infer That the Self Exists? -- 8 Personal Ontology and Life after Death, Part 1: Resurrection, Reincarnation -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Resurrection -- 8.3 Reincarnation -- 9 Personal Ontology and Life after Death, Part 2: Mind Uploading -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 Obscure and Problematic Ontology -- 9.3 How Do You Move Someone into a Computer? | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 9.4 Practical Lessons -- References -- Index | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Philosophical anthropology. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Self (Philosophy) | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Ontology. | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Ontology |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Philosophical anthropology |2 fast | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Self (Philosophy) |2 fast | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Print version: |a Brenner, Andrew Timothy, 1989- |t Personal ontology |d Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2024 |z 9781009367073 |w (DLC) 2023037577 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ucb/detail.action?docID=31344126 |z Full Text (via ProQuest) |
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