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The politics of authoritarian rule / Milan W. Svolik, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.

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"What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule -- the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule -- the problem of a...

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Bibliographic Details
Online Access: Full Text (via ProQuest)
Main Author: Svolik, Milan W., 1977- (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, [2012]
Series:Cambridge studies in comparative politics.
Subjects:
Authoritarianism.
Authoritarianism > Case studies.
Authoritarianism
Case studies
Table of Contents:
  • 1. Introduction: the anatomy of dictatorship
  • 2. The world of authoritarian politics
  • Part I. The problem of authoritarian power-sharing. 3. And then there was one!: Authoritarian power-sharing and the path to personal dictatorship
  • 4. When and why institutions contribute to authoritarian stability: commitment, monitoring, and collective action problems in authoritarian power-sharing
  • Part II. The problem of authoritarian control. 5. Moral hazard in authoritarian repression and the origins of military dictatorships
  • 6. Why authoritarian parties?: the regime party as an instrument of co-optation and control
  • 7. Conclusion: incentives and institutions in authoritarian politics.
  • 4.2 THE ALLIES' COLLECTIVE-ACTION PROBLEMAND CREDIBLE POWER-SHARING
  • 4.3 A FORMAL MODEL
  • 4.3.1 Allies' Rebellion as a Collective-Action Problem
  • 4.3.2 Authoritarian Power-Sharing without Institutions
  • 4.3.3 Authoritarian Power-Sharing with Institutions
  • 4.4 POWER-SHARING INSTITUTIONS ANDAUTHORITARIAN STABILITY
  • 4.5 CONCLUSION: THE DISTINCTLY AUTHORITARIAN PURPOSEOF NOMINALLY DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN DICTATORSHIPS
  • 4.6 APPENDIX: PROOFS
  • The uniqueness of the equilibrium in Proposition 4.1.
  • Comparative static results from Proposition 4.1.
  • Forming a larger than minimum ruling coalition κ0.
  • PART II THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITARIAN CONTROL
  • 5 Moral Hazard in Authoritarian Repression and the Origins of Military Dictatorships
  • 5.1 THE MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM IN AUTHORITARIAN REPRESSION
  • 5.2 BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF MILITARY INTERVENTION
  • 5.3 A FORMAL MODEL
  • 5.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
  • 5.5 CONCLUSION: THE POLITICAL PRICE OFAUTHORITARIAN REPRESSION
  • 5.6 APPENDIX I: PROOFS
  • Comparative statics on α∗ and β∗.
  • The government's equilibrium choice of the military's resources r∗.
  • 5.7 APPENDIX II: MULTIPLE IMPUTATION
  • 6 Why Authoritarian PartiesThe Regime Party as an Instrument of Co-optation and Control
  • 6.1 THE LOGIC OF PARTY-BASED AUTHORITARIAN CO-OPTATION
  • 6.1.1 Hierarchical Assignment of Service and Benefits
  • 6.1.2 Political Control over Appointments
  • 6.1.3 Selective Recruitment, Promotion, and Repression
  • 6.2 REGIME PARTIES AND AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE
  • 6.3 CONCLUSION: WHY AUTHORITARIAN REGIME PARTIES-- 7 Conclusion: Incentives and Institutions in Authoritarian Politics
  • 7.1 WHY DICTATORS PRESIDE OVER POLICY DISASTERS.

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