Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance [microform] : preventing bank panics without moral hazard / Antoine Martin.
Asks whether a central bank policy of providing liquidity to banks during panics can prevent bank runs without causing moral hazard. This kind of policy has been widely advocated, most notably by Bagehot (1873). Shows that a particular central bank liquidity provision policy can prevent bank panics...
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| Format: | Microfilm Book |
| Language: | English |
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Kansas City [Mo.] :
Research Division, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City,
[2001]
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| Series: | Research working paper (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City) ;
01-05. ASI microfiche library. Non-depository collection ; ASI 2001 9381-10.256. |
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