Test of the Kernel and Two Bargaining Set Models in Four- and Five-Person Games [electronic resource] / Abraham D. Horowitz and Amnon Rapoport.
Employing a computer-controlled experimental paradigm for studying coalition formation and bargaining, the present study tests three models for n-person games in characteristic function form, namely, the bargaining set and two of its subsets, the competitive bargaining set and the kernel. Twelve gro...
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Format: | Electronic eBook |
Language: | English |
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[S.l.] :
Distributed by ERIC Clearinghouse,
1972.
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ED081805
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ED081805 | Available |