Test of the Kernel and Two Bargaining Set Models in Four- and Five-Person Games [electronic resource] / Abraham D. Horowitz and Amnon Rapoport.
Employing a computer-controlled experimental paradigm for studying coalition formation and bargaining, the present study tests three models for n-person games in characteristic function form, namely, the bargaining set and two of its subsets, the competitive bargaining set and the kernel. Twelve gro...
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| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
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1972.
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| Summary: | Employing a computer-controlled experimental paradigm for studying coalition formation and bargaining, the present study tests three models for n-person games in characteristic function form, namely, the bargaining set and two of its subsets, the competitive bargaining set and the kernel. Twelve groups of subjects participated in several four person and five-person Apex games. The effects of group size, order of communication, learning, and values of the characteristic function were systematically investigated. The final outcomes reject the kernel and support the two bargaining set models; they depend upon group size and order of communication. Models describing the bargaining process, rather than the final outcomes only, are presented, tested, and partially supported. The relationships between the final outcomes of the present study and those of previous studies of Apex games are briefly discussed. (Author) |
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| Item Description: | ERIC Document Number: ED081805. Sponsoring Agency: National Inst. of Mental Health (DHEW), Bethesda, MD. |
| Physical Description: | 38 p. |