When Does Teacher Incentive Pay Raise Student Achievement? [electronic resource] : Evidence from Minnesota's Q-Comp Program / Aaron Sojourner, Kristine West and Elton Mykerezi.
Teachers vary widely in their ability to produce student achievement gains (Hanushek 1971, Hanushek and Rivkin 2010) but this ability is not predicted by educational degrees or experience beyond the first few years of a teacher's career (Hanushek 2003, Aaronson et al 2007). This has large econo...
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| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
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Distributed by ERIC Clearinghouse,
2011.
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| 100 | 1 | |a Sojourner, Aaron. | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a When Does Teacher Incentive Pay Raise Student Achievement? |h [electronic resource] : |b Evidence from Minnesota's Q-Comp Program / |c Aaron Sojourner, Kristine West and Elton Mykerezi. |
| 260 | |a [S.l.] : |b Distributed by ERIC Clearinghouse, |c 2011. | ||
| 300 | |a 16 p. | ||
| 500 | |a Availability: Society for Research on Educational Effectiveness. 2040 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. Tel: 202-495-0920; Fax: 202-640-4401; e-mail: inquiries@sree.org; Web site: http://www.sree.org. |5 ericd. | ||
| 500 | |a Abstractor: ERIC. |5 ericd. | ||
| 500 | |a Educational level discussed: Grade 3. | ||
| 500 | |a Educational level discussed: Grade 4. | ||
| 500 | |a Educational level discussed: Grade 5. | ||
| 500 | |a Educational level discussed: Grade 6. | ||
| 500 | |a Educational level discussed: Grade 7. | ||
| 500 | |a Educational level discussed: Grade 8. | ||
| 516 | |a Numeric (Numerical/Quantitative Data) | ||
| 516 | |a Text (Reports, Research) | ||
| 520 | |a Teachers vary widely in their ability to produce student achievement gains (Hanushek 1971, Hanushek and Rivkin 2010) but this ability is not predicted by educational degrees or experience beyond the first few years of a teacher's career (Hanushek 2003, Aaronson et al 2007). This has large economic consequences (Chetty et al 2010, Hanushek 2010), which motivates policy and research interest in pay for performance (P4P). Advocates of P4P believe that tying teacher compensation to performance will support increased efforts from incumbent teachers and attract better potential teachers to the profession (Lazear 2003). Many school districts and states are experimenting with P4P plans, which set compensation criteria beyond the conventional ones: experience and education. This report provides new evidence on several issues of theoretical importance related to P4P contracts in education. For instance, it is not clear what the optimal team size for targeting bonuses should be. On one hand, incentives tied to school-level criteria may encourage efficient effort if there are positive externalities from cooperation (Weitzman and Kruse 1990) or variations in incentive strength across teachers (Ahn 2008). On the other hand, free riding may make individual or small team incentives preferable (Kandel and Lazear 1992). Since Q-Comp districts adopted a wide range of P4P contracts, the authors are able to investigate whether incentives offered at lower levels of aggregation (such as the individual teacher or grade) are more or less productive than those offered at higher levels of aggregation (such as the school or district level). There are also important theoretical questions about how to measure teacher quality and performance. Measures based on principal or peer subjective evaluations have received some attention in the literature, especially since principals seem able to identify the best and worst teachers (Jacob and Lefgren 2008). However, high-stakes subjective evaluation processes may be captured and converted into de facto salary augmentations (Neal 2011). Minnesota's Q-comp offers a valuable opportunity to examine if a high-stakes P4P plan based on subjective evaluations affects educational outcomes. The experience in Minnesota adds to the authors' understanding of locally-designed P4P plans. The grantor-grantee relationship between education authorities and districts has advantages because it allows use of local information and experimentation in finding appropriate, feasible designs. The authors' findings suggest that if a granting authority proposes a range of reforms and allows districts to design plans locally, many districts (in cooperation with local teachers' unions) will design plans that base rewards largely on subjective evaluations and this does not seem to benefit student achievement. On the other hand, some districts (in cooperation with their local teachers' unions) will weight rewards to more specific teacher-centered criteria and this appears beneficial for achievement. The fact that, despite large gains in some areas of the program, Minnesota spent $200 million to get a net effect of zero also points out risks associated with too much local control over the plans. Some plans will operate to extract rents from the state more than to improve education. State and federal governments can, however, use the experiences of early adopters, such as Minnesota, to chose more appropriate program guidelines. (Contains 16 tables and 1 figure.) | ||
| 524 | |a Society for Research on Educational Effectiveness. |2 ericd. | ||
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Teaching (Occupation) |2 ericd. |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Teacher Effectiveness. |2 ericd. |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Educational Objectives. |2 ericd. |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Achievement Gains. |2 ericd. |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Outcomes of Education. |2 ericd. |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Academic Achievement. |2 ericd. |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Teacher Motivation. |2 ericd. |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Incentives. |2 ericd. |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Merit Pay. |2 ericd. |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Motivation Techniques. |2 ericd. |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Compensation (Remuneration) |2 ericd. |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Evidence. |2 ericd. |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Criteria. |2 ericd. |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Program Effectiveness. |2 ericd. |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Cooperation. |2 ericd. |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Teacher Evaluation. |2 ericd. |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Evaluation Criteria. |2 ericd. |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Elementary Education. |2 ericd. |
| 700 | 1 | |a West, Kristine, |e author. | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Mykerezi, Elton, |e author. | |
| 710 | 2 | |a Society for Research on Educational Effectiveness. | |
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