Regulatory capture in banking / prepared by Daniel C. Hardy.

Banks will want to influence the bank regulator to favor their interests, and they typically have the means to do so. It is shown that such "regulatory capture" in banking does not imply ineffectual regulation; a "captured" regulator may impose very tight, costly prudential requi...

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Bibliographic Details

Online Access:	Full Text (via ProQuest)
Main Author:	Hardy, Daniel C. L. (Author)
Corporate Author:	International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Financial Systems Department
Format:	eBook
Language:	English
Published:	[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Financial Systems Dept., ©2006.
Series:	IMF working paper ; WP/06/34.
Subjects:	Banks and banking > State supervision. Financial institutions > State supervision.