Regulatory capture in banking / prepared by Daniel C. Hardy.
Banks will want to influence the bank regulator to favor their interests, and they typically have the means to do so. It is shown that such "regulatory capture" in banking does not imply ineffectual regulation; a "captured" regulator may impose very tight, costly prudential requi...
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| Online Access: |
Full Text (via ProQuest) |
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Financial Systems Dept.,
©2006.
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| Series: | IMF working paper ;
WP/06/34. |
| Subjects: |
| Summary: | Banks will want to influence the bank regulator to favor their interests, and they typically have the means to do so. It is shown that such "regulatory capture" in banking does not imply ineffectual regulation; a "captured" regulator may impose very tight, costly prudential requirements to reduce negative spillovers of risk-taking by weaker banks. In these circumstances, differences in the regulatory regime across jurisdictions may persist because each adapts its regulations to suit its dominant incumbent institutions. |
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| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (23 pages) : illustrations. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 22-23) |
| ISBN: | 1283516659 9781283516655 9781451908305 145190830X |
| Source of Description, Etc. Note: | Print version record. |