Evolutionary games and the replicator dynamics / Saul Mendoza-Palacios, Onésimo Hernández-Lerma.

"This Element introduces the replicator dynamics for symmetric and asymmetric games where the strategy sets are metric spaces. Under this hypothesis the replicator dynamics evolves in a Banach space of finite signed measures. The authors provide a general framework to study the stability of the...

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Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Mendoza Palacios, Saúl (Author), Hernández-Lerma, O. (Onésimo) (Author)
Format:	Book
Language:	English
Published:	Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2024.
Series:	Cambridge elements. Elements in evolutionary economics.
Subjects:	Noncooperative games (Mathematics) Dynamics.